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COMPARING U.S. AND E.U.
STRATEGIES AGAINST WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION:
SOME LEGAL CONSEQUENCES

MILAGROS ALvAREZ-VERDUGO·

I.

INTRODUCTION

Weapon(s) of mass destruction (WMD) is not a legal concept. Nonetheless the social sciences regularly use this term to encompass nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons to distinguish them from conventional
weapons and indicate their inability to discriminate between civil and
military targets. From a legal point of view, the international regulation
of WMD belongs to the general law of disarmament and arms control.
Their use under the strict conditions of the rule prohibiting states from
using force in their international relations is governed by rules of international humanitarian law, most of them customary in nature. International
treaties govern the production, ownership and maintenance of a stock of
WMD and contain three different sets of rules; one for each WMD technology. In fact, the dominant international legal activity concerning
WMD has been the negotiation and implementation of arms control treaties. Consequently, while some customary international norms restrict or
* Assistant Professor of Public International Law at the Universitat de Barcelona and Visiting scholar at Harvard University. The article results from a research project financed by the Spanish Ministry of Education - Postdoctoral Fellowship Program. The greater part of the work was
done while I was Visiting Scholar at Cornell University (academic year 2004/5). An earlier version
of this paper was presented at the Fifteenth Annual Fulbright Symposium on International Legal
Problems-Centennial Regional Meeting of the American Society of International Law on April 8,
2005, at Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco. Thanks are due to all those who
commented on the drafts. The usual disclaimer applies.
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prohibit the use of certain types of WMD, international law does not
make the development and possession of WMD illegal outside the treaty
context. 1
In the post-Cold War era, WMD have become a renewed problem for
international peace and security. 2 Some old problems concerning membership, compliance and enforcement of the relevant treaties already in
existence persist. Nonetheless, technological development, technical
difficulties in controlling dual-use products and materials, disintegration
of states, and international terrorism are at the root of some 'new security
concerns:' control over the production and distribution channels of these
weapons; and control over goods and products susceptible to dual military and civilian use. In addition, the political emphasis has shifted to
the possibility of international terrorist groups using WMD and, within
this framework, connections between such groups and some proliferant
states. In this sense, the notion of 'proliferation' is shifting, as it comes
to include the spread of WMD both among states and from states to nonstate actors or terrorist groups.
International regulation and control of WMD is not a United States European Union bilateral issue, but it appears on the political agenda of
the transatlantic relation and agreements or disagreements between the
two have international consequences. Agreements signal joint action by
an important part of the international community and, often, can inspire
or encourage universal commitments as well as other international actions. Disagreements, however, block such joint action and, sometimes,
impede international measures of universal (or at least collective) scope.
Within this context, the purpose of this article is to analyze how these
two major international actors, the United States (U.S.) and the European
Union (E.U.), define their strategies and policies to deal with problemsold and new-related to WMD. In fact, the U.S. approach to managing
proliferation of WMD has undergone a remarkable evolution, if not a
change, in the post-Cold War era. 3 At the same time, it has been a period
1. As understood from the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. See Advisory Opinion 1996I.C.J. 226.
2. See, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure
World: Our Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (2004); see also, Report of the UN Secretary
General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, UN Doc.
Al59/2005 (2005).
3. This evolution began with the Counter-Proliferation Initiative, announced on December 7,
1993, by the U.S. Secretary of State Les Aspin, during his speech to the National Academy of Sciences' Committee on International Security and Arms Control. The Initiative introduced for the first
time a new military component in the U.S. policy against WMD. Other documents from the Clinton
Administration including the military and the possible use of force as a component of the U.S.
counter proliferation policy are as follows: Proliferation: Threat and Response - 2001, Department
of Defense (Jan. 10, 2001); Proliferation: Threat and Response - 1997, Department of Defense
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of remarkable changes for the European integration process, leading to
the transformation of the European Communities (a specifically economic organization) into the E.u. (an obviously political entity). Although its policies and actions have long included much that is related to
nonproliferation matters, the E.U. had not designed a general approach
against WMD until two years ago.
Three criteria will guide the comparison between the U.S. and the E.U.
policies against WMD: scope, objectives and instruments. The two reference documents are "The National Strategy to combat WMD" adopted
on December 2002, and "The European Strategy against the proliferation
ofWMD," approved by the European Council on December 2003. 4 The
comparison should permit identification of the grounds for possible
changes in the international regime of these kinds of weapons.
II.

THE U.S. AND THE E.U. POLICIES AGAINST WMD:
DIFFERENT SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

Disarmament and arms control are the two main axes of the international
debate on WMD. The first puts the very existence of these weapons under discussion, seeking to destroy them, while the arms control perspective tries to establish an international legal framework for the use, production and development of these weapons. International actors' policy
scope and objectives can be located on these two general axes; and the
current international legal regime of WMD belongs, primarily, to the
arms control perspective, although it includes important disarmament
elements.
A.

U.S. POLICY SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES s

A narrow definition of the threat arising from WMD determines the
scope of U.S. policy. Indeed, if compared with documents of relevant
(Nov. 25, 1997); Proliferation: Threat and Response, Department of Defense (Apr. 1996) (visited
Sept. 1,2005) <http://www.fas.org/irp/threatlwmd.htm>.
4.
See
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releasesI2002112IWMDStrategy.pdf>
and
<http://ue.E.U ..intluedocslcmsUpload/stJ570S.en03.pdf.> The E.U. was reluctant to adopt a WMD
Strategy based on a Common Position, a Joint Action or a Common Strategy, the legal instruments
available under the E.U. Common Foreign and Security Policy. Consequently, the Strategy is a
political declaration with an informal character. Concern that this would undermine implementation
was offset by the commitment to review policy impact regularly and, every six months, the External
Relations Council discusses a progress report on the implementation of the E.U. Strategy. The first
of these debates took place on June 14, 2004, when the Council discussed and adopted the First
Progress Report on the implementation of the E.U. Strategy. See Press statement, Council for General Issues and Foreign Relations, Sess. No. 2591, at 15 (Luxemburg June 14,2004).
5.
A diagnosis of the problem and goals for resolving it are set up in the initial paragraphs of
the U.S. Strategy. See National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, at Introduction
(Dec. 2002).
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international organizations and with previous U.S. documents, the current
U.S. diagnosis of the WMD threat is limited and restricted: only WMD
in the possession of hostile states and terrorists are considered a threat. 6
The U.S. Strategy does not define the criteria U.S. authorities will use to
determine the hostility of states, leaving that as a political decision.
Similarly, with no international definition of terrorism, the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act set up a list of criteria according to which
U.S. authorities regularly update a list of foreign terrorist groups; its content has been, sometimes, controversial. 7
The restricted scope of U.S. policy against WMD has its parallel in U.S.
goals. While titled "The National Strategy to combat WMD" and presented as a strategy for countering WMD, including their use and further
proliferation, the document is very specific that the goal is the protection
of the U.S., American forces and U.S. friends and allies from the "existing and growing WMD threat." In this sense, the U.S. goal can be qualified as clearly subjective: WMD are not, in themselves, the problem, nor
is proliferation. The U.S. objective is to protect itself and its allies or
friends from a possible use of WMD by previously targeted actors. 8
This goal is given concrete expression in three target areas: counterproliferation to combat WMD use, nonproliferation to combat WMD
proliferation, and consequence management to respond to WMD use.
The last relates to internal measures to react to and face the consequences

6.
As Cirincione says, the Bush Administration has changed the issue from "what" to "who."
See Joseph Cirincione, Speech: Proliferation Threats and Solutions, 19 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF
LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY 344 (2005). This diagnosis means a clear change from previous
U.S. National Security documents. For example, the 1999 U.S. National Security Strategy stated as
follows: "WMD is a global concern that transcends national borders. It is the greatest potential
threat to global stability and security. Proliferation threatens to provide rogue states, terrorist and
international crime organizations with the means to inflict terrible damage on the U.S., our allies,
and U.S. citizens and troops abroad." See The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New
Century 2 (Dec. 1999).
7.
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) are foreign organizations designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as
amended. See <http://www.state.govlslctlrls/fs/3719I.htm> (visited Aug. 10,2005).
8.
In this area, there are significant changes too. The U.S. National Security Strategy adopted
in 1998 fixed the following goals: to deter and be prepared to counter the use or threatened the use of
WMD; to reduce the threat posed by existing arsenals of WMD; to halt the smuggling of nuclear
materials, identity the technical information, technologies and materials that cannot be allowed to
fall into the hands of those seeking to develop and produce WMD, and to stop the proliferation of
non safeguarded dual use technologies that place these destructive capabilities in the hands of parties
hostile to U.S. and global security interests. See The White House, A National Security Strategy for
a New Century 6 (Dec. 1998).
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of a WMD attack. Internal measures are not relevant from the internationallegal point of view or, therefore, to the purposes of this article. 9
The counter-proliferation policy is intended to prepare the U.S. military
and appropriate civilian agencies to deter and defend against the full
range of possible WMD employment scenarios. It seeks to assure that
U.S. forces can sustain operations to defeat WMD-armed adversaries.
Counter-proliferation has, therefore, a specific meaning: deterrence, defense and, if need be, victory over hostile states and terrorists. At this
point, it is relevant to point out the equal treatment that the Strategy envisions for state and non-state actors presenting a WMD threat.
The nonproliferation policy is targeted to prevent states and terrorists
from acquiring WMD and missiles. To this end, the Strategy proposes
enhancing "traditional measures" (diplomacy, arms control, multilateral
agreements, threat reduction assistance and export controls) that seek to
dissuade or impede those seeking access to sensitive technologies, material and expertise. Additionally, the policy purports to ensure compliance with relevant international agreements; to improve the capability to
prevent unauthorized transfers of WMD and missile technology, expertise, and material; and to identify and pursue new methods of prevention,
such as national criminalization of proliferation activities and expanded
safety and security measures.
B.

E.U. POLICY SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

The scope and objectives of the E.U. policy with regard WMD seem to
be in line with the major statements of international organizations. The
scope of the E.U. policy is "proliferation of WMD," defined as a threat
against international peace and security and against the E.U. and its in-

9.
Nonetheless, Fidler considers that this is part of the 'new' strategy on WMD. He argues
that WMD policy is moving from one dominated by arms control to a three-part strategy. The first
part involves international law that addresses WMD threats presented by states (arms control treaties
and the 'new' right of self-defense to address WMD threats from state actors). The second part
comprises international law that attempts to address WMD threats posed by non-state actors, namely
terrorists (multilateral antiterrorism treaties, efforts to use international law to improve the safety and
security of WMD agents and equipment and military responses to terrorist threats). The third part of
the trifurcated strategy focuses on domestic defense against and preparedness for WMD events: a
"homeland security" framework that is taking shape through international cooperative efforts on
improving domestic readiness for WMD attacks against vulnerable societies. See David P. Fidler,
International Law and Weapons of Mass Destruction: End of the Arms Control Approach? 14 DUKE
J. COMPo & INT'L L. 39-88 (2004).
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terests. The risk that terrorists will acquire this kind of weapon "adds a
new critical dimension to this threat" according the E.U. position. 10
The different status of E.U. Member States as regards nuclear weapons
(particularly, the status of France and the United Kingdom as legal nuclear powers under the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons--NPT ll ) shapes the European position, preventing the E.U.
from rejecting all WMD outright. 12 On the other hand, the E. U Strategy
clearly advocates for a universal ban on chemical and biological weapons, because all member states have ratified the Conventions on Biological and Chemical Weapons. 13
Concerning terrorism, the E.U. diagnosis reflects the current historical
period in linking WMD with international terrorism, recognizing that
international terrorism adds a new dimension to the problem of WMD,
and expressing concern consistent with the perspective of other European
organizations. 14 This link, however, does not change or shift the responsibility for WMD proliferation away from states. In fact, the E.U. seems
to be confident that exerting control over states can significantly reduce
the terrorism risk, since internal state action can reduce the access of
terrorists groups to the expertise, resources, technical infrastructure, and
logistics needed to develop and use WMD. 15
With this delimitation of scope, the E.U. objectives are "to prevent, deter,
halt, and where possible, eliminate proliferation programs of concern

10. See E.U. Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction ~ I(Dec. 2003)
[hereinafter E.U.-WMD Strategy].
II. See Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 729 U.N.T.S. 1-10485.
12.
In similar sense, see Gerrard Quille and Stephen Pullinger, The European Union: Tackling
the Threatfrom Weapons of Mass Destruction, in ISIS REpORT (Nov. 2003) (visited July 1,2005)
<http://www.isis-europe.org!>; see also Clara Portela, The Role of the E.U. in the Non-Proliferation
ofNuclear Weapons, PRIF REpORTS No. 65, 3-5 (2003).
13. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and On Their Destruction (BTWC), lOIS U.N.T.S.
1-14860; see also Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and On Their Destruction (CWC), 1975 U.N.T.S. 1-33757.
14. According to E.U. analysis, the connection between WMD and terrorist groups is particularly strong in terms of chemical and biological weapons because their specific characteristics make
them especially attractive to terrorists. See E.U.-WMD Strategy, supra note 10, ~ 8.
IS.
The document states that non-proliferation, disarmament and weapons control can make a
fundamental contribution to the global fight against terrorism. !d., ~ 3. The Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU) advocates for an approach to the state proliferation ofWMD that differs
from the strategy to deal with the WMD/international terrorism connection. See Report submitted
on behalf of the Defense Committee by Mr. Schloten, Chemical and biological weapons control new challenges, WEU Doc. AlI758 (Dec. 5, 2001); see also Report submitted on behalf of the
Defense Committee by Mr. Le Guen, Chemical, Biological and Radiological Terrorism, WEU Doc.
AlI858 (June 3,2004).
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worldwide." 16 This is in fact a limited, but realistic, objective. Elimination of proliferation is subject to conditions of possibility (though their
nature is not explained), and the objectives do not include each and every
WMD program (which would be beyond E.U. capacities). Determining
which programs are of concern worldwide is necessarily subjective.
Concern worldwide does not mean Security Council determination. 17
The E.U. position is a universal one, but the Union remains reluctant, on
this particular point, to limit possible action to only those programs determined by the Security Council to be a threat.
III.

CONSEQUENT INSTRUMENTS

In order to compare U.S./E.u. instruments in the fight against WMD, I
will use a double classification. The first classification distinguishes
between unilateral and multilateral instruments. The second distinguishes between legal, diplomatic and operational instruments. Multilateral instruments include universal and regional, or restricted, cooperation
among states and can have a formal legal basis (international agreement)
or an ad hoc political basis. Finally, both unilateral and multilateral instruments can be legal, diplomatic or operational in nature.
A.

U.S. INSTRUMENTS

U.S. policy against WMD differentiates between counter-proliferation
and nonproliferation instruments. The U.S. counter-proliferation set of
instruments builds upon three components: interdiction, deterrence, and
defense and mitigation. Interdiction efforts seek to prevent the movement of WMD materials, technology, and expertise to hostile states and
terrorist organizations. To this end, the strategy proposes to enhance
U.S. military, intelligence, technical, and law enforcement capabilities.
In other words, the U.S. approach relies on unilateral enforcement measures of both operational (military, intelligence and technical capabilities)
and legal nature (law enforcement capabilities).
Deterrence instruments are used "to persuade potential adversaries not to
seek or use WMD." The special characteristics of contemporary adversaries (hostile states and terrorist groups) require, following the U.S.
Strategy, new methods of deterrence. Beside a strong declaratory policy
and effective military forces, the U.S. Strategy adds the right to respond
with overwhelming force - including resort to all U.S. options - to the
See E.U.-WMD Strategy, supra note 10, ~ 2.
17. Under the current state of international law on disannament and anns control, the proliferation programs of states that are not parties to present international treaties can be questioned only if
the Security Council detennines that they are a threat to international peace and security.
16.
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use of WMD against the U.S., American forces abroad, or friends and
allies. Deterrence instruments are, therefore, unilateral instruments of
both diplomatic (strong declaratory policy) and operational nature (effective military forces with the right to respond with overwhelming force to
the use ofWMD).
Finally, defense and mitigation involves the capabilities, including preemptive measures, of U.S. military forces and civilian agencies to defend
against WMD-armed adversaries. 18 This requires an ability to detect and
destroy an adversary's WMD assets before they are used. In addition, it
includes robust active defenses (such as air and missile defenses to disrupt, disable or destroy WMD targets) and passive defenses, as well as
mitigation measures (against the effects of WMD attacks). Hence, they
are unilateral instruments of an operational nature.
The U.S. Strategy clearly puts the emphasis on counter proliferation
measures; it is the first pillar developed, and the words used emphasize
this preference. U.S. counter-proliferation instruments are, basically,
unilateral measures. Specifically relevant is the U.S. policy treatment of
the use of force as a possible counter-proliferation instrument. With no
reference to the principle prohibiting the threat or use of force, the formulation of the use of force in the document carries no constraint similar
to the condition of proportionality required by customary international
law on self-defense. 19 In addition, the U.S. right to respond, as character-

IS.
The debate around the 'preemptive use offorce' goes beyond the scope and purpose of this
article. A few examples of the literature on the issue are as follows: Abraham D. Sofaer, On the
Necessity ofPre-emption , 14(2) EUR. J. INT'L L. 209-226 (2003); Michael Bothe, Terrorism and the
Legality of Pre-emptive Force, 14(2) EUR. J. INT'L L. 227-240 (2003); VVAA, Agora: Future
Implications of the Iraq Conflict, 97(3) AM. J. INT'L L. 553-642 (2003); Agora(Continued), 97(3)
AM. J. INT'L L. S03-S72 (2003); Michael N. Schmitt, U.S. Security Strategies: a legal assessment, 27
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 737-736 (2004). Schmitt considers current U.S. Strategies not, in
themselves, unlawful but possibly so depending on the U.S. action and application. This is not the
point of view of Thomas M. Franck, who affirms that U.S. National Security Strategy:
set out the doctrine that the nation is free to use force against any foe it perceives as a
potential threat to its security, at any time of its choosing and with any means at its
disposal... [and] aims at ending all collective control over the U.S. recourse to force.
This is not a system transformation but a system abrogation. 97(3) AM. 1. INT'L L. 619620 (2003).
I agree with Professor Franck's opinion.
19.
Relevant members of the Bush Administration clearly express their faith in and support for
this policy, stating the belief that some states' cooperation (i.e. Iran) "has been helpfully motivated
by their fear of U.S. action against them." See John R. Bolton, The Bush Administration's Forward
Strategy for Nonproliferation, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 403 (2005). Christopher Clarke Posteraro proposes
the legal doctrine of anticipatory counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation intervention, as a legitimate
answer to the modem threat of international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. See Christopher Clarke Posteraro Intervention in Iraq: Towards A Doctrine of Anticipatory CounterTerrorism, Counter-Proliferation Intervention, 15 FLA. 1. INT'L L. 151-212 (2002).
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ized in the Strategy, changes a traditional U.S. security assurance that it
will not use nuclear forces against non-nuclear countries. 20
Nonproliferation, the second leg of the U.S. strategy, includes a wide set
of actions that, nevertheless, do not always comprise concrete measures.
The U.S. document begins by referring to "Active Nonproliferation diplomacy" to dissuade supplier states and to induce proliferant states to
end their programs. This activity includes building coalitions to support
U.S. initiatives; the document seems to refer to ad hoc coalitions, established on a case-by-case basis. 21
Second, concerning existing multilateral nonproliferation and arms control regimes, the document's emphasis is on improving their effectiveness and compliance by member states, but there are few mentions of
concrete measures directed toward these ends. Particularly, the Strategy
includes three measures regarding the NPT and the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA): ratification of an IAEA Additional Protocol by
all NPT states, assurances that all states put in place full-scope IAEA
safeguards agreements, and appropriate increases in funding for the
Agency. The Strategy also proposes strengthening the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and, specifically, proposes support for
universal adherence to the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.
Third, under the title of 'Threat Reduction Cooperation" the document
includes the U.S. assistance program to Russia and other former Soviet
states (security of WMD facilities, missiles, and related materials) and
endorses international action through the G-8 Global Partnership against
the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. These endorsements, however, do not come with any declaration in favor of increasing funding.
Fourth, controls on nuclear materials focus on discouraging the worldwide accumulation of separated plutonium and minimizing the use of
highly enriched uranium. To this end, the document makes reference to
the National Energy Policy and the goal of developing recycling and fuel
treatment technologies that are cleaner, more efficient, less wasteintensive, and more proliferation-resistant. No other reference exists to,
20.
See Principles and Objectives adopted by the NPT 1995 Review Conference and Security
Assurances Doc. NPT/CONF.2000/6. See Alyn Ware, Nuclear Proliferation: Rule of Force or Rule
ofLaw? Legal Responses to Nuclear Threats from Terrorism, Proliferation, and War, 2 SEATILE J.
SOc. JUST. 251 (2003-2004).
21.
The document concludes this section with a statement that, if nonproliferation efforts fail,
U.S. will have available operational capabilities to defend against WMD use.
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for example, the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)22 or any other
measure related to the supply of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes.
The U.S. export controls system is the fifth line of action on nonproliferation efforts. The Strategy proposes updating and strengthening that
system while recognizing the needs of U.S. businesses. To this end, the
U.S. will focus on truly sensitive exports to hostile or proliferant states,
while removing unnecessary barriers in the global marketplace. 23
Finally, nonproliferation sanctions are treated as a component of the
strategy against WMD proliferation. The U.S. document contains no
discussion of the necessary legal basis of this instrument (the UN Security Council, regional organizations, etc.) and seems to anticipate the
modification of the existing U.S. sanctions legislation to better integrate
sanctions into overall U.S. strategy.24
Generally, there is no clear U.S. preference for a particular set of nonproliferation instruments. Instead, the document contains general statements
concerning universal regimes, with no reference to concrete measures
directed at reinforcing their effectiveness and compliance. Nor is there
any mention of 'co-responsibility' instruments, such as U.S. disarmament commitments and other self-constraint measures in the area of nuclear materials.
Finally, four enabling functions are aimed at integrating the pillars of
U.S. policy. The first is improved intelligence collection and analysis of
the full range of WMD threats. The second deals with research and development to develop cutting-edge technologies that can quickly and
effectively detect, analyze, facilitate interdiction of, defend against, defeat, and mitigate the consequences of WMD. The third function, titled
"Strengthened International Cooperation" refers exclusively to working
22.
The FMCT is under discussion in the Conference on Disarmament. Following an initiative
from President Clinton, the U.N. General Assembly adopted in Dec. 1993 Resolution 48/75L calling
for the negotiation of a "non-discriminatory, multilateral and international effectively verifiable
treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices." For the full text of the U.N. resolutions and key documents of the Conference on disarmament related to the FMCT, see the Federation of American Scientists website
<http://www.fas.orglnuke/controllfmctl>.
23.
So, the recent legislation making exports of nuclear materials (highly enriched uranium)
easier is not necessarily 'an accident' in the U.S. legislative process. Among other critiques to this
legal change, see Scott Parrish, Despite Nuclear Terrorism Risks, Congress Relaxes REV Export
2005,
CNS
Research
Story (visited Aug.
16, 2005)
Controls, August 4,
<http://www.cns.miis.edulpubs/weekl050804.htm>;andAlanJ.Kuperman.TheEnergyBiII·sGift
to Terrorists, NEW YORK TIMES, August 11,2005.
24. About the 'usefulness' and 'employment' of WMD-related U.S. unilateral sanctions, see
Bolton, supra note 19, at 397-398.
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closely with like-minded countries on all elements of the U.S. nonproliferation strategy. Finally, the fourth function is to unite all elements of
the overall strategy in targeted efforts against both supplier and recipient
states and terrorist groups that seek to acquire these weapons.
B.

E.U. INSTRUMENTS

Four main principles guide the European approach to proliferation: multilateralism, comprehensive action, co-responsibility, and gradualism. 25
Multilateralism incorporates the defense, implementation, and reinforcement of international disarmament and nonproliferation treaties and
agreements, as well as support for multilateral institutions that verify and
control compliance. The comprehensive action principle implies the
employment of all the Union's resources and tools to achieve E.U. goals
and the integration of nonproliferation into all E.U. policies. Coresponsibility acts in two different directions: first, through export control on dual use goods and technologies and, second, through the E.U.'s
contribution to solving the main causes of instability (development assistance, reduction of poverty, and promotion of human rights). Lastly, the
principle of gradualism guides the application of anti-proliferation measures, which are both preventive and coercive. The former constitutes the
first line of defense against proliferation for the E.U. and includes political and diplomatic actions as well as reliance on competent international
organizations. The latter embraces measures envisaged in Chapter VII of
the United Nations Charter and under international law, which the E.U.
would consider using only if preventive measures fail. Concerning adoption, the document is not clear about what the measures actually entail or
whether they are an exclusive Security Council matter. It mainly states
that this body "should playa central role."
From these principles, the E.U. Strategy designs an action plan with four
groups of measures: (1) measures to implement an effective multilateral
response; (2) measures to promote international and regional stability;
(3) measures to implement cooperation with key E.u. associates; and (4)
internal structural and organizational measures. The last group relates to
issues not relevant for the purpose of this article. 26 The bulk of E.U.
25.
These principles underlie the E.U. Strategy and they can be found, specifically, within
paragraphs 14 and 15.
26.
The E.U. Council machinery dealing with the implementation of the E.U. Strategy includes
a Personal Representative of the Secretary General and three Working Groups acting under the
CFSP pillar: CONOP (non-proliferation), CODUN (on UN Disarmament issues), and COARM (on
conventional arms exports). These groups include representatives from Member States, the Commission, and the Personal Representative and meet once a month. Within this context, the E. U.
Strategy calls for the establishment of a specific unit within the Council's Secretariat to reinforce the
present arrangements. This unit would function as a monitoring center, entrusted with the monitor-
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measures propose effective multilateralism in determining what action to
take against those who proliferate WMD.27
1.

Measures to implement an efficient multilateralism

The E.U. tackles the execution of an efficient multilateral response
against proliferation with a large set of measures that can be separated
into three groupS:28 (i) promotion of relevant legal regulations regarding
WMD; (ii) reinforcement of verification mechanisms and control of internationallegal regulations; and (iii) avoidance of the misuse of dual use
(civil and military) goods and processes.
(i) The promotion of relevant legal regulations regarding WMD is pursued through three complementary measures. First, diplomatic action
seeks the universalisation of existing international treaties, including
their verification regimes - like those contained in the Additional Protocols of the IAEA. 29 Second, direct assistance - technical and/or financial
- is provided to third states to ensure the correct implementation of international agreements on WMD. This refers specifically to the implementation of two agreements, the BTWC and the CWC, that seek to overcome the administrative (legislative, institutional, etc.) and/or financial
difficulties (implementation costs) that some states face in complying
with these international commitments. Third, financial support is given
to relevant multilateral institutions (IAEA, the Preparatory Commission
for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO),

ing of the consistent implementation of the E.U. Strategy and the collection of information and
intelligence, in liaison with other E.U. agencies (i.e. the Situation Centre) and as a full associate of
the Commission. The creation of the Centre, not yet put in place, could affect specific Community
competencies, currently in the hands of the European Commission.
27. At the end of each semester, the Council debates and adopts a progress report on the implementation of this action plan. These reports are a great tool in evaluating the advantages and
obstacles of the E. U. as a nonproliferation actor as well as the agreements and disagreements of its
member States on specific aspects of measures envisaged in the action plan. Until now, there are
three Reports. See Council of the E.U., Doc. 10448/04, Brussels, June 10, 2004 (First Progress
Report); Doc. 15246/04, Brussels, December 3, 2004 (Second Progress Report); and Doc. 9898105,
Brussels, June 8, 2005 (Third Progress Report) (visited July 1,2005) <http://ue.E.U ..int>.
28. The document groups these measures into six main tenets: (I) the universalisation of
current legal regulations and verification regimes regarding disarmament and non-proliferation; (2)
emphasis on the role of the UN Security Council in increasing the amount of available information;
(3) reinforcement of widespread support for verification regimes; (4) reinforcement of policies and
export control practices; (5) development of security for materials and equipment to prevent unauthorized access and diversion risks; and (6) intensification of the fight against illegal trafficking.
29. This measure includes some clear E.U. action, in partiCUlar the Common Position decided
November 17, 2003 on the globalization and reinforcement of multilateral agreements concerning
WMD. See 2003 OJ.E.U. (L 302) 34. Another precedent, though one of a more specific nature, is
the Council Decision 2003/567/CFSP of July 21, 2003 implementing Common Position
19991533/CFSP related to the European Union's promotion of early implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). See 2003 OJ.E.U. (L 192) 53.
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and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW)).
(ii) The second group of measures seeks to reinforce the verification
mechanisms and control of international legal regulations related to
WMD. To this end, the Strategy proposes the effective use of existing
mechanisms and the design of new ones. This commits the E.U. to promote challenge inspections within the CWC framework and to continue
the study of the verification instruments for the BTWC and the CWe. In
regard to the BTWC, the E.U. seeks to establish a group of experts to
assist with compliance with its norms. 30
(iii) The third group contains measures to avoid the misuse of dual use
(civil and military) goods and processes through export control, equipment and materials security, and the fight against illegal trafficking.
Concerning export control, the Strategy seeks to reinforce the E.U. regime, as well as to ensure some degree of E.U. foreign policy coherence
in these matters. 31 It calls for the establishment of a program to assist
those countries with insufficient knowledge about exports control and the
adoption of two specific restrictive measures. Together, these establish
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to subject exports to the ratification
and implementation of the IAEA. Additional Protocol and encourage
reinforced export controls over intangible transfers of dual use technology.
In regard to physical security, unauthorized access, or the potential of
diverting equipment and materials, the E.U. pursues effective control of
highly radioactive sources as well as the physical protection of nuclear
materials and facilities.32 Moreover, the E.U. proposes reinforcing con30.
Additionally, the E.U. participates in the annual meetings of States Parties and experts
meetings leading up to the BTWC Review Conference in 2006. In March 2005, the Personal Representative put forward suggestions on how the E.U. can promote universality and implementation of
the BTWC and the relevant E.U. working groups are currently examining a preliminary draft E.U.
joint action on support for the BTWC, which would be implemented in 2006. In addition, a loint
Action in support of the CTBTO verification system is under consideration and, as we have already
mentioned, the E.U. endorses the establishment of the IAEA Additional Protocol as the verification
standard mechanism.
31.
The Strategy calls for coordinating E.U. policies within the framework of existing regimes;
supporting the compliance of new member states with these regimes; promoting the Commission's
participation in these international regimes; and stimulating when necessary the introduction of
catch-all clauses in export control regimes.
32.
Concerning E.U. internal action, see Council Directive 2003/122IEURATOM of 22 December 2003 on the Control of High Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources and Orphan Sources, 2003
O.J.E.U. (L 346) 57-64 (Euratom). In addition, all member states have ratified the Convention on
Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and have agreed to convene a Conference to widen the
scope of this Convention.
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troIs on pathological microorganisms and toxins, and promoting a dialogue between E.U. and U.S. industries to increase the awareness of
WMD issues, particularly those related to biological weapons. 33 E.U.
external action has focused on radioactive sources and is being implemented through the IAEA structures. 34 Nonetheless, the E.U. also carries
on autonomous actions supporting the nuclear nonproliferation and security programs in Russia.
Finally, the document proposes three measures to fight illegal trafficking:
the adoption of common E.U. penal sanctions; measures to control the
transit and transfer of high-risk materials; and support for international
initiatives aimed at combating illegal trafficking. Their implementation
includes a European Community Regulation amending the Community
Customs Code to ensure enhanced safety and improvement of risk analysis,35 the declaration of the E. U. Council of June 1, 2004 - which supports the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) - and, in particular, the
Statement on Interdiction Principles adopted on September 4, 2003 by
the states that participate in the PSI. 36 In contrast, discussion continues
on the adoption and possible implementation of common policies related
to criminal sanctions for illegal export, brokering and smuggling of
WMD related material.
2.

Measures to promote international and regional stability

Reflecting the E.U.'s position emphasizing international cooperation for
achieving international and regional stability, the action plan proposes
33.
The E.U. strategy does not specify what type of measures will further these goals, nor does
it recommend any concrete action by the E.U. and/or its member states; these can be found in the
June 2003 Action Plan. See Measures Nos. 18-19 of the Action Plan adopted in June 2003. Two of
these measures must be emphasized. First, the creation of a center for disease control. See Regulation (EC) No. 85112004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 establishing
a European center for disease prevention and control, 2004 O.J.E.U. (L 142) I-II, and Alessandro
Andreoni, The E. U. Moves Closer to Establishing a European CDC, January 8, 2004,
<www.cns.miis.eduipubs/weekl040108.htrn>. Second, a proposal encouraged by the E.U. and its
member States during the BTWC annual experts meeting to elaborate guidelines on how to boost
efficient national legislation as well as compliance with the BTWC dispositions-the E.U. stance was
actually contrary to the U.S. one. See Tucker, The BWC New Process: A Preliminary Assessment,
II NONPROLIFERATION REv. 32-33 (2004).
34.
See Council Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP of 17 May 2004 on support for IAEA activities
under its Nuclear Security Program and in the framework of the implementation of the E.U. Strategy
against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2004 O.J.E.U. (L 182) 46-50. The financial
reference amount for the implementation of this Joint Action is $ 3,329,000 (euros). According to
the Third Progress Report, the envisaged renewal of the Joint Action will expand geographic priorities to cover countries in North Africa and the Middle East and will include a new project providing
legislative assistance to implement the IAEA Additional Protocol.
35. Adopted by the E.U. Council on May 23, 2005.
36.
See Council of the European Union, Non-Proliferation Support of the Proliferation Security Initiative, Brussels, June I, 2004, Doc. 10052/04 (Presse 189). The Declaration confirms the
connection between the PSI and the U.N. Security Council Res. 1540, April 28, 2004.
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reinforcing E.U. cooperative threat reduction programs and integrating
WMD nonproliferation concerns into the E.U. 's political, diplomatic, and
economic activities and programs. The Russian Federation is the main
target of those programs and, thus, the first E.U. action in this field has
been the Council Joint Action of November 22, 2004. 37
The second action envisaged in the E.U. Strategy is to increase E.U. financial support for disarmament and nonproliferation 38 by including a
specific line in the European Community budget for WMD disarmament
and nonproliferation activities and encouraging member states to contribute financially.39 Unfortunately, a specific Community budget line
for WMD has yet to be created. 40 Nor has the E.U. adopted the technical
assistance program for third countries envisioned by the strategy. This
program should have the aim of guaranteeing security and control over
high-risk material, facilities, and information by facilitating the conversion ofWMD expertise.
Better results have been achieved with the implementation of mainstreaming nonproliferation policies into the E.U.'s relations with third
countries, including a nonproliferation clause in agreements with those
countries. Although the clause does not have the same language and
scope in all these treaties, in all cases it requires effective action against
proliferation risks and implementation is monitored using regular political dialogue between the parties to the agreements, at both ministerial

37.
This joint action extended the E.U. disannament and nonproliferation program to the
Russian Federation after June 2004 by supporting the physical protection of a Russian nuclear site.
This extension is linked to, and is a result of, the extension of the period of application of the Common Strategy on Russia. See Council Joint Action 20041796/CFSP of 22 November 2004 on the
issue of support of the physical protection of a nuclear site in the Russian Federation.
38.
The E.U. committed itself, during the G8 Summit in Kananaskis, to support the G8 International Association with $100 million (euros) over a period of 10 years in order to fight against the
proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction.
39.
The credits included in the E.U. budget under the heading "Non-proliferation and disarmament," are meant for two purposes. First, to fund actions which contribute to the reduction of
WMD and, second, to fund operations to fight against the spread of light weaponry and illicit arms
trafficking, unless these actions are mentioned in the Cotonu Agreement (which deals with this type
of actions within the ACP countries). This budget structure persists to the present.
40.
Consequently, the E.U. financial resources in the non-proliferation area come from the
CFSP budget ($15 million (euros) in 2004 and $17 million (euros) in 2005) and the Community
budget (around $40 million (euros) per year, particularly through the TACIS program). In addition,
the European Parliament introduced an amount of$3 million (euros) into the 2004 and the 2005 EC
budget for a Pilot Project, the purpose of which is to investigate measures by which the E. U. instruments can support actions against the proliferation of WMD and combat the proliferation of light
weapons and illicit arms trafficking. Out of this, the Commission used $1.5 million (euros) under
the 2004 budget to finance the Research Institute SIPRI to analyze how the Community could contribute to WMD non-proliferation and disarmament, related materials, equipment and technologies.
For 2005, the Commission will use the $1.5 million (euros) for launching cooperative actions in the
field of export control. See Third Progress Report, supra note 27, at 11-12.
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and official levels. 41 These agreements do not provide for specific enforcement mechanisms and the enforceability of such clauses is surrounded with specific legal problems. Nonetheless, they do provide a
basis for continued pressure and permit the E.D. to initiate the necessary
dialogue and work with the third country in order to achieve effective
compliance with the nonproliferation clause. 42
Lastly, the Strategy refers to increasing E.D. efforts to solve regional
conflicts by using all available instruments, in particular the framework
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). This is very much in accord with
the general E.D. policy of addressing the root causes of the problem
while adopting measures to counter proliferation in the shorter term. The
E.D. Strategy does not specify particular measures for the Mediterranean
region, despite previously classifying it as a priority. Nonetheless, E.D.
is taking steps in order to restart a dialogue on disarmament and nonproliferation in the context of the Barcelona process. 43
3.

Measures to implement cooperation with associate countries

The point of departure is simple: international cooperation on nonproliferation should begin with agreement among associate and main ally
countries. This section of the E.D. Strategy alludes to the need to ensure
adequate supervision of the Joint Declaration for Nonproliferation be-

41.
This clause includes a commitment against WMD proliferation and its vectors by, among
other means, the complete implementation of existing international instruments and the creation of
an efficient system for national exports control. The nonproliferation clause has been inserted in the
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Tajikistan and in the Association Agreement with
Syria. In addition, a clause referencing cooperation in countering proliferation of WMD (based in
the nonproliferation clause) has been inserted in the revised ACP-E.U. Cotonou agreement concluded by the E.U. with 78 countries and signed on June 24,2005. In parallel, Action Plans with the
countries of Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean in the context of the European Neighborhood
Policy include a WMD chapter, containing the key elements of the WMD clause. In the case of
Pakistan, a parallel instrument to the Community Agreement that would contain a nonproliferation
clause is to be negotiated by the Council and, as a follow-up to the E.U.-Indian Summit in 2004, an
Action Plan with India is being negotiated which will include some actions related to WMD. For
more details on these issues, see Third Progress Report, supra note 27, at 13-14.
42.
Annalisa Giannella, Permanent Representative of the Secretary General/High Representative on the Non-proliferation ofWMD, explained it clearly: "Once we [the E.U.) have concluded the
agreement, we should not leave the other country alone and then, after a certain period of time,
assess whether they are complying or not; we have to work with this country and see what they need
in order to comply with the clause." See House of Lords, European Union Committee, Preventing
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The E. U. Contribution, 13 1h Report of Sess. 20042005 (AprilS, 2005) Minutes of Evidence, Question 58.
43. See Third Progress Report, supra note 27, at 14.
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tween the E.U. and the U.S. 44 and coordination with other key associate
countries and the adoption, if necessary, of joint initiatives.
As the United States is a critically important actor in the campaign
against WMD proliferation, nonproliferation is on the agenda of every
E.U.-U.S. summit meeting and a cooperative action plan was agreed on
at the June 2004 summit. This was renewed at the 2005 summit, under
the title of "Joint Program of Work on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction."45 In addition, the E.U. and the U.S. have developed a tradition of consulting whenever important international events in
the area of nonproliferation and disarmament arise (at the expert level as
well as at political directors and ministerial levels) and there are regular
staff-to-staff contacts. 46
E.U. interaction and cooperation with other international actors also exists, but with different features. The E.U. assists Russia and other exSoviet Republics financially and technically in the area of nonproliferation and disarmament (protection of sites, conversion of scientists, etc.).
India, Pakistan and China are all on the priority list of the strategy and,
specifically, the E.U. plans to assist them with the setting up of export
control legislation and implementation systems.
IV. THE GROUND TO FURTHER CHANGES IN THE
INTERNATIONAL REGIME OF WMD
The comparison between the U.S. and the E.u. strategies reveals deep
differences on the diagnosis, goals and treatment of the risks and challenges posed by WMD nowadays. These differences ground the current
situation of the WMD international regime and the emergence of new
trends in the nonproliferation arena.
As a preliminary conclusion, it is possible to define U.S.IE.U. approaches as reactive and proactive, respectively. The scope and goals of
U.S. policy belong to the parameters of classical state defense: targeted
enemies - hostile states and terrorists - and protection against those ene44. See European Council President C. Simi tis, European Commission President R. Prodi &
U.S. President G.W. Bush, Joint Statement on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass DestnJction,
Washington D.C. (June 25, 2003) Doc. 10902/03 (Presse 181).
45.
Documents and Declarations adopted at the E.U.-U.S. summits can be found at
<http://europa.E.U ..inticomrnlexternaIJelationslU.S.lintro/summit.htm> (visited July 1,2005).
46.
Concerning the interactions, complementarities and some points of disagreements on
nonproliferation issues between the E.U. and U.S., see the declarations and memorandum of Ms.
Giannella at the House of Lords. See House of Lords, European Union Committee, Preventing
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass DestnJction: The E. U. Contribution, 13 th Report of Sess. 20042005 (AprilS, 2005) Minutes of Evidence, Question 61 at 43.
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mies, specifically against their WMD capabilities. Consequently, the
U.S. has adopted a self-defense approach that explains the dominance of
counter-proliferation and unilateral measures in the U.S. Strategy. 47
Significantly, the U.S. strategy assigns no role to U.S. disarmament in
the combat against WMD, eroding the fundamental bargain that underlies the nonproliferation regime. In the case of the E.U., its diagnosis
and goals are determined by the real nature of the E.U.: an international
organization used to deal with international problems through a multilateral mechanism. Since two of its member states are legal nuclear powers, the E.D. does not ask for a complete disarmament ofWMD. Instead,
the E.U. focus on proliferation follows a logical nexus of causality that
links proliferation to an increased risk of utilization. Within this context,
the E.U. designs measures to contribute to the achievement of a double
aim: the elimination of proliferation programs and the reduction of diversion. The E.U.'s structure also explains its pragmatism in establishing
goals in the fight against WMD and reveals the current debate on the
scope of the principle prohibiting the threat or the use of force.
U.S.-E.D. differences set a limit to the scope of new international legal
obligations and the application of the international legal rules already in
force. In fact, the U.S. diagnosis of the WMD threat makes the elaboration of new general norms with universal scope difficult because, from
the U.S. point of view, the threat has no objective delimitation: it does
not come from the mere existence of WMD or, even, from proliferation
but depends on the characteristics of their 'owners.' Only on the link
between WMD and terrorism can the D.S. and the E.U. strategies find
some common understanding, although their tone, attitudes and diagnoses of the threat differs substantially. Denying terrorist groups access to
WMD has become the arena for specific U.S.-E.U. joint action. In contrast, problems arising from 'proliferant states' become political questions, and U.S.-E.D. joint action depends on the concrete circumstances
of each case.
Political emphasis on the risks coming from the link between WMD and
terrorism has consequences for the application of international obligations and rules related to WMD. This emphasis has its main expression
in UN Resolution 1540, adopted by the Security Council on April 28,
2004, under the aegis, among others, of the U.S. and the E.D.. Acting
under Chapter VII, the Security Council decided that all states shall
adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws and domestic controls to
47.
Using Bolton's words, the Bush Administration "is reinventing the nonproliferation regime
it inherited' and its policies show "that a robust use of the sovereign authorities that we [U.S.], and
our allies, have at our disposal can bring about real results." See Boiton, supra note 19, at 395.
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avoid the access of non-state actors to WMD and their means of delivery.
The Security Council also established a committee that will report on the
implementation of this resolution. Even if the Security Council recognizes that some states may require assistance in implementing the provisions of this resolution in their territories, there is no provision organizing an international mechanism to provide that assistance. Instead, the
resolution calls for the voluntary cooperation of those states in a position
to offer such assistance. 48 Examples of this voluntary cooperation are the
U.S. program of nuclear threat reduction (Nunn-Lugar Program),49 focused on minimizing the proliferation risks attached to nuclear material
in the former Soviet Union, as well as the G-8 initiative agreed upon in
June 2002, which had similar goals and territorial scope. As we have
seen previously, the E.U. is developing this kind of assistance program.
Yet, their benefits and advantages do not entirely banish distrust. Many
countries, not only Russia, have difficulty implementing the SC Resolution and other WMD obligations, and important gaps arise in the destruction and control of WMD, as in the case of biological weapons. This is
not to deny the achievements of voluntary international cooperation but
to point out its risks and deficits and the desirability of international
mechanisms to provide assistance to states 'unable' to find voluntary
partners.
Concerning compliance, the U.S. policy scope (hostile states) introduces
discriminatory criteria when determining whether any country has fulfilled its international obligations. This affects the application of international treaties and other WMD-related obligations not endowed with
verification and enforcement mechanisms, because a very relevant international actor - the U.S. - will not pay attention to cases of noncompliance coming from states not hostile to U.S. security or other interests.
The U.S. policy sends a clear message to the international community:
noncompliance with WMD obligations can be counterbalanced by a
'healthy' political relationship with the U.S .. In fact, since the U.S. will
not be bothered with these cases, these proliferation programs will not be
of 'concern worldwide' and, consequently, will not meet the requirements established in the E.U. strategy for European attention.
The diverging approach of the U.S. and the E.U. on the role, application
and development of international verification mechanisms to monitor
48.
The Security Council adopted the resolution unanimously. Nonetheless, the debates reflect
many points of concern, as it is the appropriateness of using the Security Council to "legislate" on
such an issue or the need to stress the relationship between proliferation and disannament. See U.N.
Doc. SIPV.4956 (2004).
49.
On the current difficulties and obstacles of this program, see Richard G. Lugar, NunnLugar in the Second Term, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB. POL'y 233 (2005).
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states' compliance with their WMD Treaty obligations is well known.
U.S. opposition to international verification mechanisms, made evident
with regards the BTWC, in December 2001, prevented the adoption of a
protocol with such a mechanism. 50 The U.S. also sought to revise the
existing negotiating mandate for the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
(FMCT), which called for an "effectively verifiable" treaty, because it
considers that an effectively verifiable FMCT that does not compromise
U.S. national security interests is not achievable. 51 A similar argument
justifies the U.S. refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT). 52 Instead, U.S. policy relies on unilateral measures or,
at the most, on selective multilateral measures, such as the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI), announced in May 2003 by President Bush.
PSI is an informal agreement to intercept ships, aircraft, and vehicles
suspected of carrying nuclear and other WMD missiles and related technologies or materials to or from "countries of proliferation concern." It
allows participating states to detain and search suspect shipments as soon
as they enter their territory, territorial waters, or airspace. 53 The E.U.
approved a Declaration supporting this initiative on June 1, 2004, emphasizing its connection with the UN Security Council Resolution obligations, and most of the E.U. States have joined the PSJ.54
Finally, major concerns arise concerning the enforcement of WMD obligations. As we have seen before, U.S. policy clearly endorses the unilateral use of force as a counter proliferation instrument. Such a use of
force not only avoids any kind of collective control and breaks with the
50.
Regarding the problems encountered during the negotiations for the Additional Protocol,
see Malcolm R. Dando, Preventing Biological Warfare: The Failure of American Leadership (Great
Britain: Palgrave, 2002); Jonathan B. Tucker, The BWC New Process: A Preliminary Assessment,
II NONPROLIFERATION REv. I (2004), and Kenneth D. Ward, The BWC Protocol: Mandate for
Failure, 12 NONPROLIFERATION REv.! (2004).
51.
U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development. Fiscal Year
2006
Joint
Performance
Plan
(Feb.
2005)
p.
121
<http://www .state.gov/documents/organizationl4l623.pdf>.
52.
See Patricia Hewitson, Between Empire and Community: The United States and Multilat-

eralism 2001-2003: A Mid-Term Assessment: Arms Control: Nonproliferation and Reduction of
Nuclear Weapons: Risks of Weakening the Multilateral Nuclear Nonproliferation Norm, 21
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 451 (2003).
53.
"PSI is an activity, not an organization.... Through PSI, we create the basis for action to
ensure that we can stop proliferators in their tracks .... PSI's foundation is our respective national
legal systems and relevant international authorities." Bolton, supra note 19, at 400. Bolton's misunderstanding (one of them) is to say that the PSI reflects the reality that proliferators are circumventing existing rules against proliferation. If it is, PSI proves the necessity of international enforcement mechanisms and the role of international cooperation in order to apply international
norms already in force.
For two different perspectives concerning the legal problems around the PSI, see Samuel
54.
E. Logan, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Navigating the Legal Challenges 14 J. TRANSNAT'L
L. & POL'y 253 (2005) and Daniel H. Joyner, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Nonproliferation,
Counterproliferation, and International Law 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 507 (2005).
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customary requirements of self-defense but, in addition, abrogates a U.S.
traditional security assurance: not to use nuclear forces against nonnuclear countries. On the other hand, the E.U. Strategy is not clear on
either the role of coercion - especially military force - against proliferation threats, or on the position of the Security Council. The E.U. envisions the adoption of coercive measures (under Chapter VII of the Charter and other measures under international law) but is not clear about
what such measures might actually entail or whether they are an exclusive Security Council matter. It mainly states that that body "should play
a central role," not the primary competence as stipulated in article 24 of
the UN Charter. In this way, the E.U. Strategy leaves open the door for
the possibility of coercive measures of a military nature without the explicit authorization from the Security Council. E.U. ambiguity contributes to diminish the credibility of the nonproliferation regime. This
credibility rests on three main pillars: the network of commitments between nuclear and non-nuclear states; the prohibition of chemical and
biological weapons (with a different scope under conventional and customary rules); and the proper functioning of verification mechanisms in
order to guarantee the compliance of states with these obligations. The
UN Security Council is uniquely empowered with the right to declare a
state proliferation program to be a threat to international peace and security and to determine proper sanctions against such a state. Unilateral
statements about willingness to violate international legal rules (although
rhetorical) are usually at the root of proliferation programs and may well
be the source of the fears causing unpredictable arms races. In addition,
the threat or use of force has proven ineffective in avoiding or eliminating a proliferation program: Iraq's proliferation program ended with the
UN inspection action in 1991-1998, as the subsequent U.S. occupation of
Iraq has demonstrated. 55
V.

FINAL REMARKS

Are we witnessing the misuse and decline of international legal instruments or beholding the birth of new complementary measures in the
WMD international regime? The answer to this question exceeds the
scope and purpose of this article. However, comparison of the U.S. and
the E.U. policies to combat WMD - and the scope of their agreements
and disagreements - permits U.S. to address two consequences. First, the
role of international organizations and verification mechanisms in the
application of international rules concerning WMD is being downplayed.
Instead, this application relies principally upon the internal structure and
55. See Jessica Tuchman, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the United Nations, 10 GLOBAL
GoVERNANCE 265-271 (2004).
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capabilities of states, while some states attribute to themselves the right
to enforce certain WMD obligations. Second, the prevailing approach to
fighting the proliferation of WMD is through selective and informal international cooperation: selective because there is a preference for international cooperation between like-minded countries;56 informal since the
preference is for non-legally binding agreements.
Should these consequences consolidate in time, changes might appear in
the principle of equal sovereignty between states and in the nature of
international cooperation. Whether this is a necessary evolution, a conjuncture period, or a step back in the international legal system, only
history - and further research - will be able to clarify.
Cambridge MA, September 23, 2005

56.
Dupuy qualifies this cooperation as "collective unilateralism." See J.M. Dupuy, The Place
and Role of Unilateralism in Contemporary International Law, II EUR. J. INT'L L. 29 (2000).
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